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I. Introduction 
 
A public lawyer at the Scottish Bar tells of the first time that they invited the Court of Session to 
strike down an Act of the Scottish Parliament (ASP) on the basis that it was ultra vires in terms of 
section 29 of the Scotland Act 1998. According to that provision an ASP ‘is not law’ – and therefore 
may be declared by the courts to be invalid – where, inter alia, it ‘relates to’ a matter reserved to the 
United Kingdom (UK) Parliament, is incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) or is incompatible with EU law. In the words of Ewing and Dale-Risk, the 1998 Act created a 
‘clear and unambiguous power (and duty) to strike down legislation passed by a democratically 
elected Parliament.’1 Yet when, in the early days of devolution, our protagonist asked the Court to do 
just that the response from the bench was somewhat sceptical: ‘we can’t do that…can we?’ So alien to 
judicial culture in the UK was the role of courts to review the validity of primary legislation that not 
even the explicit instruction to do so in the Scotland Act was comfort enough for some members of 
the judiciary at that time to avail themselves of that power.  
The source of such discomfort is easy to locate. A defining feature of the UK constitution has been the 
absence of constitutional review of primary legislation. The traditional approach taken by courts to 
the legality of Acts of Parliament was captured by Ungoed-Thomas J in Cheney v Conn:2 
What…statute itself enacts cannot be unlawful, because what the statute provides is itself the law, and 
the highest form of law that is known to this country. It is the law which prevails over every other form 
of law, and it is not for the court to say that a parliamentary enactment, the highest law in this country, 
is illegal.3 
This culture of restrained judicial power vis-à-vis primary legislation was so engrained that when the 
policing of boundary disputes as between the UK Parliament and the (aborted) Scottish Assembly 
came to be considered in 1978, officials stressed that their resolution by the judiciary ‘should not be 
contemplated’ as this would run contrary to ‘the spirit of devolution within a unitary state with one 
sovereign Parliament.’4  
Those concerns barely registered when Scottish devolution was revived and delivered by the Labour 
Party following its general election victory in 1997. For those who had framed the devolution 
settlement, judicial control of the legislature was an important point of departure from the 
Westminster tradition: to be a model for democracy, said Bernard Crick and David Millar, ‘[a new] 
Scottish Parliament…needs [to be limited by law] as much as any other.’5 At the same time, the 
judiciary was beginning to shed its own inhibitions. As it was put by Lord Rodger in Whaley v Lord 
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Watson of Invergowrie,6 the radicalness of this new approach was radical only in the particular 
context of the UK: taking a broader view, he said, the Scottish Parliament had merely ‘joined that 
wider family of Parliaments [that] owe their existence and powers to statute and are in various ways 
subject to the law and to the courts which act to uphold the law.’7 Indeed – and as officials had feared 
in 1978 – the prospect that devolution might undermine the sovereignty of the Westminster 
Parliament itself was given credence by Lord Steyn who, in Jackson v Attorney General,8 cited the 
Scotland Act 1998 alongside the influence of EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights 
as evidence of a ‘divided sovereignty’ that in his view had rendered the classic Diceyan account of 
sovereignty ‘to be out of place in the modern United Kingdom.’9          
If this new power of the judiciary - to strike down primary legislation passed by a democratically 
elected parliament - could be defended on constitutional grounds it was also likely to give rise to 
concerns of a similar nature: on the one hand, a concern from democracy about the proper 
constitutional role of the judiciary vis-à-vis a democratically elected, representative and accountable 
legislature;10 on the other hand, by being ‘dragged into the political arena’ in order to police 
constitutional boundaries, it was argued that the integrity of the judges themselves was at stake: their 
decisions, it was feared, would not be portrayed as ‘upholding individual rights but as the thwarting of 
the democratic will’ as expressed through the acts of the new legislature and executive.11 
Reflecting these concerns, the Scotland Act 1998 makes provision for a sympathetic reading to be 
given to ASPs in the form of a statutory requirement for judges, where possible, to read down 
legislation in order to achieve and give effect to its intra vires interpretation. According to section 101 
of the 1998 Act, where legislation ‘could be read in such a way as to be outside competence’ the 
contested provision(s) must ‘be read as narrowly as is required for it to be within competence’.12 In 
this chapter we will consider the impact that this obligation has had on the exercise of constitutional 
review in devolved Scotland. After setting out the judicial and parliamentary modes of constitutional 
review that co-exist in the devolution settlement we will examine the impetus and the aims which 
underpin the interpretative obligation. Whilst section 101 has rarely been relied upon by judges in the 
devolution jurisprudence, it will be seen that the provision has nevertheless been impactful in at least 
two senses, the former positive and the latter (perhaps more) negative: first, section 101 sends a signal 
to the UK and devolved legislatures about the proper balance of their respective powers; second, 
section 101 has more regularly been relied upon by the Scottish Government during the process of 
parliamentary constitutional review to encourage that a generous benefit of the doubt be given at the 
various check points for legislative competence.       
II. Constitutional review under the Scotland Act 1998 
 
In recent years public law scholarship has sought to describe, and to defend, a so-called ‘third way’ of 
constitutionalism. No clean break, this approach builds upon antecedent models of legislative 
supremacy and judicial supremacy, in which either parliament or the courts have the last word on the 
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legality of legislation.13 Two fundamental characteristics distinguish this approach. One is constrained 
judicial remedial powers. For Westminster-based parliamentary systems, the very idea of introducing 
a bill of rights with judicial review represents a fundamental departure from previously held 
assumptions that a bill of rights clashes with the core constitutional principle of parliamentary 
supremacy. However, by distinguishing between judicial review and judicial remedies, here judicial 
review does not displace the idea that parliament has the final say on the validity of legislation. The 
second fundamental characteristic is that this approach envisages a more important role for rights 
review at the legislative stage than is usually associated with a bill of rights. By including a statutory 
obligation to report to parliament when a Bill is inconsistent with rights this particular legislative 
focus reflects the following three ideals:14 identifying whether and how proposed legislation 
implicates rights; encouraging more rights-compliant ways of achieving legislative objectives (and in 
the extreme discourage the pursuit of objectives that are fundamentally incompatible with rights); and 
facilitating parliamentary deliberation about whether legislation implicates rights, and thereby 
increasing parliament’s capacity to pressure government to justify, alter or abandon proposed 
legislation that unduly infringes upon rights.15 
In some respects Scotland’s devolution scheme fits neatly with the model of judicial supremacy. First, 
the Scottish Parliament is not a sovereign legislature but rather is one for which constitutional limits 
have been enshrined in statute. Second, and perhaps most obviously, it is the UKSC– and not the 
Scottish Parliament - that has the last word on whether an ASP is law. Indeed, Lord Neuberger has 
said that this power bestows upon that court some of the characteristics of a constitutional court. Just 
as in a country with a constitution ‘the Supreme Court (as in the US) or the Constitutional Court (as in 
Germany) can, indeed must, strike down legislation which has been enacted by the democratically 
elected parliament if the court concludes that the legislation does not comply with the Constitution,’ 
he said, so too the (UK) Supreme Court must strike down any legislation that has passed through the 
democratically elected devolved legislatures if the court concludes that it falls outwith legislative 
competence as defined in statute.16 Third, when vetting Bills for legislative competence, officials 
across the Scottish Government, the Scottish Parliament and the UK Government apply a method of 
assessment that anticipates what (in their view) the Supreme Court would decide if asked to rule on 
the matter. In this way the jurisprudence of the court might impact upon Bills as they pass through the 
policy development, pre-introduction and parliamentary stages even if the resulting legislation itself is 
never made subject to a legal challenge. However, and despite the court’s strong powers of 
constitutional review, the judicial role is tempered in two ways. On the one hand, the Scotland Act 
encourages the courts to approach legislative competence in a way that respects the political 
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legitimacy of the Scottish Parliament, first by requiring the judiciary – where possible – to construct a 
sympathetic reading of legislation so as to avoid it being struck down as invalid; second, the court has 
the power to remove or to suspend the retrospective effect of a decision that legislation is outwith 
competence,17 or to suspend the effect of a decision so as to allow the Scottish Parliament to cure any 
defect so as to bring the legislation within competence.18 On the other hand, the primary responsibility 
for the constitutional review of all bills falls on political actors and officials engaged in the 
parliamentary review of legislative competence, which if properly exercised should minimise the 
opportunities for judicial censure.      
For those engaged in the law-making process – from civil servants, to legislators, to courts, to those 
public bodies and private actors who rely on the rights and duties conferred by legislation – the 
consequences of legislating beyond the Parliament’s competence are severe, for a number of reasons. 
First, there is a clear risk of reputational damage both to the Scottish Government and to the Scottish 
Parliament where legislation is found to be defective. Second, because legislation might have been in 
force for some time, and/or have been widely and deeply relied upon, there may be uncertainty as to 
the status of any rights or obligations that arise therein at least until such time as the matter has been 
settled by a court. Third, there are serious concerns for the Scottish Government if elements of its 
legislative agenda face delay and defeat. Fourth, there is an associated remedial cost both in terms of 
the parliamentary time required to cure defective legislation and in terms of damages or other 
remedies that might arise as a result of an adverse ruling. Finally, there is a possibility that courts 
themselves might suffer reputational damage where they are perceived to have overstepped the mark 
in striking down primary legislation passed by a democratically elected legislature.19 In order to 
protect legislation against this vulnerability the Scotland Act 1998 established a framework of pre-
enactment checks and cross-checks for all Bills which engage the Scottish Ministers or, in the case of 
a non-Government Bill, the responsible Member20 with both the Scottish Parliament and the UK 
Government in the exercise of vetting Bills for legislative competence: 
(1) On or before the introduction of a Bill, the responsible Minister must report to Parliament that 
in his or her view the Bill is within the Parliament’s legislative competence;21 
(2) On or before the introduction of a Bill, the Presiding Officer must report to Parliament his or 
her view as to whether or not the Bill is within the Parliament’s legislative competence;22 
(3) Following the completion of the Bill’s parliamentary stages, the Presiding Officer must 
withhold submission of the Bill for Royal Assent for four weeks,23 during which period the 
Scottish and UK Law Officers – the Lord Advocate on behalf of the Scottish Government, 
and the Advocate General for Scotland and the Attorney General on behalf of the UK 
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Government – may refer the question of legislative competence directly to the Supreme 
Court.24 
 
Whilst on some accounts the Scottish devolution scheme would be excluded from the new category – 
this ‘third way’ - of constitutional review on the basis that the final say on the legality of ASPs rests 
with the judiciary exercising a strong-form of constitutional review,25 we can see that both in relation 
to the new powers of the judiciary and in relation to the enhanced form of parliamentary review the 
intention has been to engender a form of dialogue between institutions about the boundaries to 
legislative competence, about the extent to which legislation might overstep the mark and about the 
appropriate remedies that might follow as a result.26 It is in this context – the effort taken to avoid 
constitutional conflict through the promotion of inter-institutional dialogue - that we should analyse 
both the positive and the pernicious effects of devolution’s interpretative obligation. 
   
III. Safeguarding the Devolution Settlement 
 
A striking feature of the Scotland Act 1998 was the absence of any safeguards for devolution against 
its repeal or amendment by anything other than an ordinary Act of Parliament. During the passage of 
the Scotland Bill various means of achieving (a degree of) entrenchment on the face of the Act were 
put forward but not taken up.27 Indeed, the most significant safeguard on the face of the Act is that 
which expressly preserves the power of the UK Parliament to legislate for Scotland in devolved 
areas.28 The legal effects of these legislative decisions – to exclude safeguards for the devolved 
legislature from the face of the Act, and to include safeguards for the UK Parliament - are more 
apparent than real. On the one hand, the power of the UK Parliament to repeal or to amend the 
Scotland Act derives from the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, not from the devolution 
legislation itself, and so any attempt to entrench the devolution settlement would remain vulnerable to 
Diceyan orthodoxy: that Parliament may by ordinary legislation ‘unmake any law whatever,’29 
including any provision purporting to entrench prior legislation even of a constitutional nature.30 On 
the other hand, the UK Parliament’s legislative sovereignty is itself the source of its power to legislate 
in devolved areas. Section 28(7) merely re-states that pre-existing constitutional principle. 
Nevertheless, these legislative decisions betray at least two aspects of the then government’s thought 
process. First, and as seen also in the model of rights protection given effect to by the Human Rights 
Act 1998, that a substantive (and arguably a radical) programme of constitutional reform should 
nevertheless leave untouched the core constitutional principle of parliamentary sovereignty.31 Second, 
that in order to sell devolution to sceptics who feared the consequent break-up of the Union – those 
such as Labour’s Tam Dayell who famously warned that devolution to Scotland would create a 
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‘highway to independence with no exit’ – the centre of gravity would have to tilt inwards towards the 
centre and not outwards towards the devolved nations. As the then Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine of 
Lairg, would later remark, this was ‘an unpalatable reminder to Scotland thought necessary to assuage 
English sentiment.’32  
If not by statute it was left primarily to constitutional convention to do the work of safeguarding 
devolution from the unwelcome intrusion of Scotland’s other Parliament. During the passage of the 
Scotland Bill through the House of Lords the then Minister of State for the Scotland Office, Lord 
Sewel, answered concerns about any potential conflict between the two legislatures on devolved 
matters with the stated expectation that ‘a convention [would] be established that Westminster would 
not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters in Scotland without the consent of the Scottish 
Parliament’33 – a convention that has evolved in its scope also to require consent for any UK 
legislation that alters the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament or the executive 
competence of the Scottish Ministers.34 Contrary to the expectation that UK legislation in devolved 
areas would be an infrequent occurrence, in practice there have been approximately 30-35 legislative 
consent motions tabled during a typical session of the Scottish Parliament, only one of which has been 
refused, albeit that the prospect of refusal has led the UK government to make amendments to 
legislation in order to achieve consent. Indeed, the way in which refusal (actual or potential) has been 
used to generate political dialogue with UK counterparts in order to improve (rather than to frustrate) 
UK legislation (or at least to make it more palatable to the Scottish Parliament) suggests that the 
convention has broadly lived up to its constitutional function: to create a space for co-operation 
between the UK and devolved governments/legislatures through ‘political dialogue’ and negotiation.35 
Whilst as a matter of constitutional law the UK Parliament retains the right to legislate in devolved 
areas even where consent has been withheld, on each of the occasions that this has occurred the 
expression of consent by the Scottish Parliament has been respected. Thus the Sewel convention has 
had a significant political, if not legal, bite by dint of which the legislative sovereignty of Westminster 
- to make or unmake any law by way of ordinary legislation - has, in the context of devolution, been 
made subject to an additional constitutional hurdle: the requirement (at least in ‘normal’ 
circumstances) to seek the consent of the Scottish Parliament. 
Following the narrow vote for Scotland to remain in the UK in the Scottish Independence Referendum 
2014, the Smith Commission, comprising representatives of the five political parties represented in 
the Scottish Parliament, was convened to make recommendations for the further devolution of powers 
to the Scottish Parliament.36 As well as the specific transfer of powers, however, the commission also 
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recommended that the 1998 Act be amended in order to strengthen the safeguards for the devolved 
institutions: first, by recognising in the Scotland Act itself the permanence of the Scottish Parliament 
and Scottish Government; second, by placing the Sewel Convention on a statutory footing.37 As to the 
former, during the passage of the Bill clauses were amended from a general ‘recognition’ that a 
Scottish Parliament, and a Scottish Government, are ‘permanent part[s] of the United Kingdom’s 
constitutional arrangements’ to something with – on the face of it – greater bite: section 1 of the 
resulting Scotland Act 2016 having amended the Scotland Act 1998 to assert that the Scottish 
Government and Parliament are permanent features of the UK constitution and that ‘in view of the 
commitment’ of ‘the Parliament and Government of the United Kingdom to the Scottish Parliament 
and the Scottish Government’ their abolition may proceed only ‘on the basis of a decision of the 
people of Scotland voting in a referendum.’38 Given the political reality that a UK Government is 
unlikely ever to seek the abolition of the Scottish Parliament it remains a question of constitutional 
theory as to whether the new provision places a legal – and justiciable – limit of manner and form on 
the residual sovereignty of Parliament to ‘unmake’ the Scotland Act. As to the latter, clause 2 of the 
Scotland Bill – which ‘recognised that the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally 
legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament’ – was passed 
without amendment.39 This begs at least two questions. First, does the new provision encompass the 
expanded scope of the Sewel convention so as to cover UK legislation that amends devolved 
competence. Despite a claim by the Advocate General to the contrary,40 it would appear that the 
answer to this question is ‘yes’: the impact on legislative competence being one reason why the UK 
Government has conceded that it will require to seek legislative consent from the devolved 
legislatures for the EU (Withdrawal) Bill 2017-19 before it becomes law.41 Second, does statutory 
‘recognition’ of the convention lend it legal and justiciable bite. In Miller v Secretary of State for 
Exiting the European Union42 the Supreme Court took a narrow approach to this question, holding 
that the requirement to seek legislative consent remains a convention (one that is recognised rather 
than given effect to by legislation) and, as such, that the court has no role to play either in its 
interpretation or in its enforcement.43    
Here lies one of devolution’s most significant asymmetries – the erection of a hard legal boundary to 
the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament in contrast to the softer political constraints 
placed on the legislative freedom of the UK Parliament. An ASP which strays into reserved matters 
‘is not law’ and can be struck down on that ground by the courts. An Act of [the UK] Parliament, on 
the other hand, which strays into devolved matters remains valid until such time as it is repealed or 
amended, even where that might have problematic practical effects in the meantime for individuals or 
groups subject to the rights or obligations that arise from any overridden ASP. This said, against the 
conventional wisdom that underpins that asymmetry – that power devolved is power retained, leaving 
unreformed and unchanged the principle of parliamentary sovereignty – can be made at least two 
arguments from constitutional law. First, there is judicial authority from the UKSC that the Scotland 
Act can properly be described as a ‘constitutional statute’ with the legal and justiciable effect that its 
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provisions are protected from implied repeal,44 chipping away at a traditional understanding of 
parliamentary sovereignty that recognises no such distinction between ‘ordinary’ and ‘constitutional’ 
statutes, and which requires effect to be given to a more recent statute where it comes into conflict 
with an earlier counterpart. Second, two features of the 1998 Act combine to realign the centre of 
gravity back towards the devolved institutions. On the one hand, Lord Hope has drawn attention to the 
construction of the Scotland Act which provides a mechanism for determining whether legislation is 
outwith (rather than for determining whether legislation is within) legislative competence, such that – 
‘within carefully defined limits’ – he could say that the devolution scheme can properly be described 
as a ‘generous settlement of legislative authority’,45 and that acting within those limits ASPs 
‘enjoy…the highest legal authority.’46 On the other hand, by placing an obligation on the courts, 
where possible, to read an ASP as narrowly as is required in order to bring it within legislative 
competence, section 101 of the Scotland Act creates a legal and justiciable safeguard against 
devolution’s centripetal force: what one Member of the House of Lords has called ‘a bias in favour of 
devolution’ where the allocation of power as between the UK and Scottish Parliaments is contested.47       
 IV. A Bias in Favour of Devolution?  
 
The explanatory notes to the Scotland Act 1998 explain the nature of this ‘bias’ in favour of 
devolution. The purpose and effect of section 101, we are told, is to ‘enable the courts to give effect to 
legislation, wherever possible, rather than to invalidate it’ and, in so doing, ‘to ensure that the courts 
will not invalidate such legislation merely because it could be read in such a way as to make it outside 
competence.’48 However, whereas the analogue provision in section 3 of the Human Rights Act 
(HRA)49 defines the purpose of the interpretative obligation - to read primary legislation compatibly 
with Convention rights, so far as it is possible to do so – but leaves to judicial discretion the method of 
achieving such a reading (to read the provision expansively or narrowly; to ‘read in’ words or phrases, 
to ‘read down’ the provision or to stretch the meaning of the words used), section 101 of the Scotland 
Act (and in relation to Acts of the National Assembly for Wales, section 154 of the Government of 
Wales Act 2006) directs courts both as to the purpose and to the method of inquiry: that legislation 
must be construed ‘as narrowly as is required’ so as to be within competence.50 During the passage of 
the Scotland Bill the then Lord Advocate, Lord Hardie, illustrated this approach by way of an 
example: 
 An Act of the Scottish Parliament might make general provision enabling the Scottish ministers to  hold 
a referendum on any matter. It would be possible to read that Act as enabling Scottish ministers to 
hold a referendum on some reserved matters such as independence or the monarchy. The Act would be 
ultra vires to that extent. However, in order to preserve the validity of that Act, the new clause would 
require the courts to read the Act as narrowly as is required for it to be intra vires, so far as it is possible 
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to do so. In other words, the courts will be required to read the Act of the Scottish parliament as 
enabling only the holding of referendums on matters within the competence of the parliament. In that 
way, the Act is not rendered ultra vires to any extent.51 
In contrast to section 3 HRA a court would not be permitted to ‘read in’52 or otherwise expansively to 
interpret the meaning of the words used in an ASP53 in order to find a reading of the legislation that is 
within competence.  
The adoption by the government of this more restrictive formulation was the subject of legislative 
debate in the House of Lords. Lord Hope, then a sitting Law Lord, intervened with a ‘plea’ that ‘the 
various rules which the court is being asked to apply in construing legislation [both in the Scotland 
Act and in the Human Rights Act] be cast in the same terms.’54 For Lord Mackay of Drumadoon, 
himself a pre-devolution Lord Advocate to the UK Government who would later be elevated to the 
bench, it was ‘desirable’ that the Scotland Act and HRA should create interpretative obligations that 
were broadly similar, and along the lines of the latter.55 However, and on the advice of parliamentary 
counsel following Lord Hope’s intervention, the government took the view that the narrow approach 
‘was the more favoured and more appropriate.’56 As Lord Hope would later observe from the bench, 
this more negative approach57 to interpretation was adopted so as to constrain the Scottish Parliament 
from expanding its legislative competence by reliance on a favourable interpretation: 
 The explanation for the choice of language in sec 101(2) is to be found in the way the limits of the 
legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament are defined in sec 29(2) . The matters listed there 
extend well beyond incompatibility with the Convention rights. They include legislation relating to 
reserved matters as defined in sch 5 and legislation which is in breach of the restrictions in sch 4 . An 
attempt by the Scottish Parliament to widen the scope of its legislative competence as defined in those 
schedules will be met by the requirement that any provision which could be read in such a way as to be 
outside competence must be read as narrowly as is required for it to be within competence.58 
Thus we see a more nuanced picture begin to emerge of the impetus behind section 101 than that of a 
‘bias in favour of devolution’. Whilst an interpretative obligation that favours competence may well 
tilt the centre of gravity as between the centre and the devolved nations back towards (but not quite 
reaching) the latter, its negative framing reinforces the constrained nature of the devolution project, 
limiting judicial as well as (on the part of the devolved institutions who have tended to legislate with a 
degree of caution as to the limits of their powers)59 legislative and executive freedom at devolution’s 
contested outer edges.60   
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In Northern Ireland the more positive approach to interpretation has been adopted. Whilst it was 
argued that the inclusion of (in addition to section 3 HRA and section 101 Scotland Act) a third rule of 
interpretation, which nevertheless shared ‘the objective of sympathetic interpretation’, might ‘lead to 
much confusion when the judges get a hold of it’61 the UK Government justified the distinct approach 
in Northern Ireland with reference to devolution’s inherent asymmetries. Assuring colleagues in the 
Lords that the Scottish and Northern Irish provisions ‘closely resemble each other in effect’, and 
recognising that ‘there are instances where it is appropriate to replicate the Scottish legislation in [the 
Northern Irish] legislation’, it was, in the UK Government’s view, nevertheless appropriate in this 
instance to take a divergent approach reflective of the idiosyncrasies of the latter, which were at least 
two-fold.62 First, a positive approach to interpretation was seen to be desirable in light of the 
combination of ECHR and EU restrictions with additional cross-cutting limitations - unique and 
essential to the Northern Irish context - relating to non-discrimination on the grounds of religious or 
political beliefs.63 Second, a more positive formulation would lessen the opportunities for strike down 
and a consequent re-balancing of legislative power in favour of UK institutions whose own legislative 
record and authority in Northern Ireland was (and remains) hotly contentious. Thus the positive 
approach to the interpretative obligation is not intended in Northern Ireland to permit the Assembly 
any greater freedom than is enjoyed by its Scottish and Welsh counterparts to push at the boundaries 
of legislative competence. Instead it too is intended to constrain: constraining the devolved 
institutions to act in a way that is non-discriminatory on religious or political grounds, and 
constraining the UK Government or Parliament from expanding its role as primary legislator in 
Northern Ireland where devolved legislation is too readily struck down as being ultra vires.  
V. A Presumption of Competence? 
 
Whilst section 101 has an important signalling function to play in relation to the balance of powers as 
between the devolved legislatures and the UK Parliament, as a tool of statutory interpretation its most 
immediate purpose is, of course, to provide guidance to the courts about the approach that they should 
adopt in relation to the validity of ASPs – ‘to ensure that legislation made by the parliament and the 
executive can be given effect in relation to matters within their competence and does not have to be 
struck down merely because it could, on a broad reading, also potentially relate to matters outwith 
their competence’64 – and in so doing to ‘reduce the risk of conflict between the Parliament and the 
[newly empowered] courts.’65 
 
At common law, statutory interpretation has been a useful tool in the armoury of the judiciary for the 
way that it has allowed the courts to establish a weak-form of constitutional review under the folds of 
a still sovereign Parliament. As it was put by Lord Steyn in an oft cited passage:  
 
 Parliament can, if it chooses, legislate contrary to fundamental principles of human rights [however] 
[t]he principle of legality means that Parliament must squarely confront what it is doing and accept the 
political cost… In the absence of express words or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts 
therefore presume that even the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of 
the individual. In this way the courts of the United Kingdom, though acknowledging the sovereignty of 
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Parliament, apply principles of constitutionality little different from those where the power of the 
legislature is expressly limited by a constitutional document.66 
 
Those principles of constitutionality have included, inter alia, the following: 
 
- Before Convention rights were given domestic effect via the HRA and the devolution 
statutes, courts in England & Wales, and later in Scotland,67 were willing to use the 
ECHR as an aid to the interpretation of statutes and to presume in the absence of express 
words to the contrary that Parliament had intended to legislate compatibly with 
Convention rights;68  
- Contrary to the Diceyan view that ‘neither the Act of Union with Scotland nor the 
Dentists Act 1878 has more claim than the other to be considered a supreme law’,69 courts 
have been willing to protect (so-called) ‘constitutional’ statutes from implied repeal by 
later statutes of either an ordinary70 or of a constitutional71 nature, whether the latter is 
expressed in general or even in particular terms;72 
- There is a now well-established line of jurisprudence to the effect that fundamental rights 
as well as other constitutional values such as the rule of law cannot be overridden by 
vague or ambiguous words in ordinary or in constitutional statutes alike.73 
As with the interpretative obligation created in section 3 HRA, the section 101 exercise departs from 
the common law principles of constitutional interpretation in at least two ways. First, the requirement 
does not depend upon legislative ambiguity or silence: even express words in a statute may be read 
down or re-interpreted so as to construct an intra vires interpretation.  Second, and contrary to the 
principle that courts should ‘give effect to the intention of [in this case, the Scottish] Parliament’ or 
that they should discover and apply ‘the true meaning of what [here, the Scottish Parliament] said,’ 
section 101 requires courts to adopt a purposive approach to the interpretation of ASPs: preferring an 
intra vires reading where such a reading is possible (within the confines of a negatively framed test), 
the intention of the legislature notwithstanding.74 
During the passage of the Scotland Bill it was argued that section 101 merely transplanted into the 
devolution context another common law principle: the so-called ‘principle of efficacy’ or 
‘presumption of constitutionality’.75 The ‘presumption of constitutionality’ may refer to a ‘principle of 
validity’ – that courts presume legislation to be valid according to constitutional procedures and 
                                                          
66 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex Parte Simms, [2002] 2 AC 115 at 131, [1999] 3 WLR 
328, per Lord Hoffmann (HL (Eng)) [Simms]. 
67 T, Petitioner, 1997 SLT 724, 1996 SCCLR 897 (Ct Sess). 
68 Ibid at 733-34, per Lord Hope. 
69 Dicey, supra note 29 at 145. 
70 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council, [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin) at para 60-67, [2003] QB 151, per Laws LJ. 
71 R (on the application of Buckinghamshire County Council and others) v Secretary of State for Transport, 
[2014] UKSC 3, [2014] 1 WLR 324, better known as the HS2 case. For commentary on the hierarchy of 
constitutional statutes see Mark Elliott, “Reflections on the HS2 Case: A Hierarchy of Domestic Constitutional 
Norms and the Qualified Primacy of EU Law” (23 January 2014) UK Constitutional Law Association (blog), 
online: <https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2014/01/23/mark-elliott-reflections-on-the-hs2-case-a-hierarchy-of-
domestic-constitutional-norms-and-the-qualified-primacy-of-eu-law/>. 
72 H v Lord Advocate, supra note 44 at para 30, per Lord Hope.  
73 Simms, supra note 66 at 131, per Lord Hoffmann; AXA v Lord Advocate, supra note 46 at paras 136-54, per 
Lord Reed. 
74 These point were made forcefully in relation to section 3 of the HRA 1997 by Lord Nicholls in Ghaidan v 
Godin-Mendoza, supra note 53 at paras 29-30. 
75 UK, HL, Parliamentary Debates, vol 593, col 1953 (28 October 1998) (Lord Hardie), supra note 51. 
norms, placing the onus on an aggrieved person or group to overturn the presumption - or to a more 
general rule of construction, albeit (and as we have seen in Canada) that the object of that rule is itself 
contested.76 On one view, and as it was put by Mr Justice Strong in Severn v The Queen,77 the object 
of interpretation might be the constitutive Act itself, it being the duty of the Supreme Court of Canada 
(SCC) to: 
make every possible presumption in favour of such legislative acts, and to endeavour to discover a 
construction of the British North America Act [BNA Act] which would enable us to attribute an 
impeached statute to a due exercise of constitutional authority.78 
On another view, and as put by Mr Justice Cartwright in McKay v The Queen,79 the proper object of 
interpretation is the specific legislation made under the authority of the constitutive act: 
 
 [I]f words in a statute are fairly susceptible to two constructions of which one will result in the statute 
being intra vires and the other will have the former result, the former is to be adopted.80      
 
This is underpinned by second order presumptions as to the intention of the legislature – ‘to confine 
itself to its own sphere’ and not to act beyond or, through the use of general wording, to expand the 
boundaries of its legislative competence - as well as to its bona fides: that widely drawn powers will 
not be struck down merely because their ultra vires abuse is possible.81   
 
It is this second limb that has been given its statutory footing in section 101: a method of construction 
that is deployed so as to distinguish and choose between possible interpretations of specific ASPs 
made under the authority of the Scotland Act 1998. However, any analysis of the second limb as it 
applies to Scotland should not lose sight of the first, for two reasons. First, because what is ‘possible’ 
– how far it is plausible to stretch the interpretation of an ASP – is inextricably bound to the 
interpretation given to the devolution legislation itself. On this question the jurisprudence is far from 
settled. In Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland,82 which concerned the interpretation to 
be given to section 32(3) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, according to which ‘the Secretary of State 
shall propose a date for the poll for the election of the next Assembly’ where (as was the case here) 
the roles of First Minister (FM) and Deputy First Minister (DFM) have not been filled within the 
statutory six week period following an election.83 For the majority, the Northern Ireland Act ‘is in 
effect a constitution’ with the effect that it should be ‘interpreted generously and purposively, bearing 
in mind the values which the constitutional provisions are intended to embody.’84 Those values might 
include the resolution of political problems by recourse to the ballot box, but they include also the 
principle that ‘government should be carried on, that there be no governmental vacuum,’85 and it was 
the latter which prevailed here: there being no requirement to hold a further election where the 
election (by the Assembly) of the FM and DFM had exceeded the six week period. Such a reading 
accords with Magnet’s view that the first limb – interpretation of the constitutive act - is ‘a great 
source of richness and strength for [Canadian] constitutional law’, freeing the SCC to review and to 
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expand the scope and meaning of the BNA Act more closely to conform with or to reflect current 
conditions.86 However, in Imperial Tobacco, Lord Reed – sitting in the Inner House of the Court of 
Session, took a much more narrow view: that the Scotland Act ‘is not a constitution, but an Act of 
Parliament’87 in respect of which ‘it is necessary to bear in mind that the Act of Parliament setting 
limits to devolved competence is itself “the authentic expression of the will of the people”, and that 
respect for their will as so expressed requires those limits to be enforced.’88 On appeal to the Supreme 
Court, Lord Hope found something of a middle ground: that ‘whilst the description of the Act as a 
constitutional statute cannot be taken, in itself, to be a guide to its interpretation,’ concern must 
nevertheless be given to the principle that ‘the Scottish Parliament should be able to legislate 
effectively’ in devolved areas and that the purpose of any ASP should therefore provide ‘the context 
for any discussion about legislative competence.’89 The constitutional intensity of the devolution 
statutes therefore remains somewhat fluid. Second, this matters because whilst the judicial method is 
constrained by the negative formulation adopted in relation to the interpretation of ASPs, the same 
constraints do not apply in relation to the interpretation of the Scotland Act itself. Put differently, it 
might be possible for counsel or for the judiciary to free themselves from those statutory constraints 
by interpreting the meaning and the scope of reserved powers in the Scotland Act itself more or less 
generously according to their context rather than by strictly focussing on the content of the contested 
ASP.    
 
VI. Section 101 and Judicial Constitutional Review 
 
Despite the expectation that the Scottish Parliament would differ in nature from Westminster’s so-
called ‘legislative sausage factory’,90 the Scottish Parliament has been something of a hyper-active 
legislature, passing upwards of 265 ASPs since its first, the Mental Health (Public Safety and 
Appeals) (Scotland) Act 1999. Perhaps giving credence to the prediction that the new powers of the 
judiciary in Scotland would give rise to a ‘government of judges’ who would regularly be invited to 
review the validity of primary legislation,91 the 1999 Act – section 1 of which provided that patients in 
mental hospitals should remain in hospital on ‘public safety’ grounds even where they were not 
susceptible to treatment – was itself made subject to judicial review in Anderson v Scottish 
Ministers.92 This case afforded to the Privy Council (the predecessor to the UKSC in devolution 
cases) an early opportunity to define the approach that the courts should take to the application of 
section 101(2). For one of the petitioners (as distinct from the others) the reason that he sought 
discharge from the state hospital was not to be returned to the community at large but instead to serve 
the remainder of his sentence in prison. The challenge presented a particular quirk to the test for 
legislative competence as drafted: that legislation must be struck down as ultra vires even where the 
class of persons for whom an incompatibility issue arises is restricted to just one individual. As Lord 
Hope put it: 
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[I]t is open to any individual who claims that [a] provision is incompatible with his Convention rights 
to challenge its legislative competence on this ground irrespective of whether anyone else is affected by 
the provision in this way. It is fundamental to a proper understanding of this new system to appreciate 
that the Convention exists to protect the fundamental rights of and freedoms of each and every 
individual. This is not a situation in which a solution that is good for most people must be accepted as 
good for everybody.93 
In the view of Lord Hope, but for the interpretative obligation, this provision would have to fall, albeit 
that - on the basis that ‘it would not be in the public interest for section 1 of the 1999 Act to be struck 
down simply because it was incompatible with [one individual’s] Convention rights’ - the court would 
have made use of section 102(1) in order to suspend the effect of that decision and allow the Scottish 
Parliament to correct the particular defect.94 Applying the section 101(2) test, however, it was held 
that ‘public’ – for the purposes of defining ‘public safety’ - could possibly be given both a broad and a 
narrow reading: in the case of the former, the public in general with whom the appellant would not 
come into contact (thus placing the legislation outwith competence); in the case of the latter, ‘a 
section of’ the public, which would include prison officers, fellow inmates and others who visit the 
prison for a range of purposes, who would require to be protected from serious harm at the hands of 
the appellant in the event of his transfer.95 With preference to be given to the narrow reading, the 
legislation could thus be saved without further amendment.  
In reaching this decision Lord Hope followed his own reasoning in the section 3 HRA case R v 
Lambert96 as to the proper scope of the interpretative obligation, which is limited by the requirement 
only to give effect to a Convention rights compatible reading where such a reading is ‘possible’. For 
Lord Hope, a sympathetic reading is not possible where the judicial re-construction of the statutory 
scheme would ‘[do] such violence to the statute as to make it unintelligible or unworkable’.97 In DS v 
HMA98 Lord Hope expanded upon the overlap between section 101 of the Scotland Act and section 3 
HRA: 
 The word ‘narrowly in sec 101(2) of the Scotland Act looks awkward where the question is whether a 
provision in an Act of the Scottish Parliament is incompatible with the Convention rights. Where 
incompatibility with the Convention rights is in issue, the obligation under sec 3(1) of the Human 
Rights Act is to construe the provision in any way that is compatible with them. Various techniques 
may be used to achieve this result. Section 3(1) defines the purpose of the exercise, not the way of 
achieving it. This is left to the court to work out according to the demands of each case.99          
Whilst the requirement to read ASPs ‘narrowly’ was seen to be defensible as it applied to the 
reserved/devolved boundary, where the issue is one of the Convention rights compatibility of an ASP 
the ‘proper starting point’ is not section 101 at all, but is to ‘construe the legislation as directed by 
section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act.’100 The obligation to construe a provision of an ASP so far as it 
is possible to do so in a manner that is compatible with Convention rights – and in so doing to set 
aside the negative formulation of section 101 for the more positive formulation in section 3 HRA – is 
a strong one. ‘The courts,’ Lord Hope continued, ‘must prefer compatibility to incompatibility.’101 
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Although not yet tested in court, given (for now) the UK’s requirement to comply with its obligations 
under EU law it would seem unlikely that the courts would forgo the more positive formulation in 
relation to interpretation under the European Communities Act 1972 in order to achieve a reading of 
legislation that is compatible with EU law.102 Thus, the overlap as between section 101 and analogue 
provisions in the HRA and ECA – and the preference for the latter where the issue relates to the 
spheres of Convention rights and one presumes also of EU law – serves to restrict the application of 
section 101 to a particular boundary and elsewhere to release the judiciary from its methodological 
constraints. Put differently, in DS Lord Hope was able to achieve from the bench (at least within 
limits) what he was unable to achieve from his seat as a legislator in the House of Lords: an alignment 
between the interpretative tests to be applied to legislation made by the Scottish and by the UK 
Parliaments. 
This alignment becomes significant when we turn to consider the devolution case load. Contrary to 
expectations the high volume of devolved legislation has not been met with a high volume of 
challenges to legislative competence. At the time of writing the validity just 18 ASPs (approximately 
one per year) have been challenged. Amongst these Convention rights have been the dominant ground 
of challenge with just three challenges at the reserved/devolved boundary and three at the EU law 
boundary. Of the five successful challenges,103 all of those have been on Convention rights grounds. If 
the judges have squeezed section 101 from the sphere of Convention rights (and perhaps also) EU law 
cases this leaves only a small number in which to develop the interpretative obligation as constructed 
in the Scotland Act. What is more, given the particular focus that is given during the process of 
parliamentary constitutional review to the reserved/devolved boundary, most notably by OAG 
protecting the interests of - and the reservations held by - the UK Government, as well as the caution 
of the Scottish Government and the legislative instincts of the Scottish Ministers and MSPs for what 
matters are reserved and devolved,104 it seems likely that the pattern of a higher volume of Convention 
rights challenges – thus favouring a turn to section 3 HRA instead of section 101 - will continue.  
Section 101(2) was applied to a reserved matters challenge in Henderson v HMA.105 There it was held 
that the imposition of a lifelong restriction order under section 210F of the Criminal Procedure 
(Scotland) Act 1995 (as amended by section 1 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003) 
encroached upon the reserved matter of the Firearms Act 1968 (which had prescribed the maximum 
penalty for offences convicted under that Act). Thus, notwithstanding the broad terms of section 1 of 
the 2003 Act, of which section 210F was but one part, the court read the provision narrowly so as not 
to extend the requirement to make lifelong restriction orders in relation to offences under the reserved 
statute.106 
In the application of its powers to interpret ASPs within competence the court must therefore adopt a 
staggered approach. First, to ask whether on a plain reading of the words used, the legislation can be 
read as being within competence.107 If not, second, to determine the particular boundary or boundaries 
which on a prima facie reading have been crossed. Third, if (as in the vast majority of challenges) the 
boundary dispute relates to compatibility with Convention rights (or, it is likely, with EU law), can 
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any reading be given to the statute (a) that renders it compatible and (b) which ‘[goes] with the grain’ 
of the legislative scheme.108 Or, if the dispute relates to the reserved/devolved boundary, can the 
legislation be construed ‘narrowly’ (a) so as to construct a reading of the provision that is within 
competence and (b) in a way which goes with the grain of the legislative scheme. Fourth, if a 
sympathetic interpretation under section 3 or section 101 is not ‘possible’ (for example, because a 
competent reconstruction would stray too far from interpretation and towards amendment,109 or 
because to do so would have political, economic or other effects that stray beyond the court’s 
institutional role and capacity110) should the court apply section 102 to remove, limit or suspend the 
effect of its decision, in the case of the latter in order to allow the Scottish Parliament to cure the 
defect.          
VII. Section 101 and Parliamentary Constitutional Review 
 
Whilst section 101 has been a limited feature of devolution jurisprudence – certainly when compared 
to recourse to section 3 HRA - at a second site of constitutional review its impact has been more often 
and more keenly felt. During the process of parliamentary constitutional review section 101 has been 
described to be an important card which the Scottish Government will play during the iterative 
processes that inform the decisions made at the various check points for legislative competence.111 
Formally, vetting for legislative competence takes place during two distinct phases - the customary 
three week pre-introduction period and the statutory four week period which precedes Royal Assent – 
in reality the heavy lifting on all fronts is done prior to introduction, by which point the Scottish 
Government will have engaged in three separate vetting processes. First, an internal process with 
SGLD and with the Lord Advocate which will inform the decision by the responsible Minister to 
affirm the legislative competence of the Bill at introduction, as well as the decision by the Scottish 
Government’s Law Officers whether or not to exercise their discretion to refer a Bill to the UKSC 
during the four-week period. Second, a process between SGLD and OSSP which will inform the 
decision by the Presiding Officer to issue a positive or a negative statement of competence at 
introduction. Third, a process between the Scottish Government and OAG that will inform the 
decision whether or not the UK Law Officers will exercise their discretion to refer a Bill to the UKSC. 
At each of these stages the key legal test for each of SGLD, the Lord Advocate, OSSP and OAG is to 
put themselves in the shoes of the UKSC and to reach a view – based on the legal tests set out in the 
Scotland Act as well as the available jurisprudence of the UKSC and, where relevant, of the ECtHR 
and CJEU - on what they believe the likely outcome would be if a Bill (or the subsequent ASP) was 
subject to challenge. Where it is thought to be more likely than not that legislation would survive a 
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legal challenge the benefit of the doubt will be given to the Scottish Government (meaning that the 
Lord Advocate will approve the section 31 report by the responsible Minister; the Presiding Officer 
will make a positive statement of competence; and/or, the Law Officers will allow the Bill to proceed 
to Royal Assent without making a reference to the Supreme Court). 
Despite the Scottish Government’s relatively clean bill of health thus far – at the time of writing there 
has been just one government Bill introduced with a negative statement,112 and no Bills have been 
referred to the Supreme Court - on one or two occasions per year there will arise serious disagreement 
as between the Scottish Government and one or more of the SGLD, the Lord Advocate, OSSP and 
OAG as to what the likely outcome of a challenge in the UKSC would be. These disagreements tend 
to focus on specific provisions within a Bill, and on the means of achieving an objective, rather than 
on the legislative scheme or on the policy objective as a whole. Where disagreement persists it would 
seem that the Scottish Government is likely (in the view of some, too likely) to give way – that is, to 
make amendments to the legislation in order to secure its safe passage. These amendments might be 
made as much for practical reasons – for example to avoid delay to the passage of the legislation and 
any knock on effect to a tightly constructed legislative programme - as for principled ones (i.e. being 
genuinely persuaded that the relevant provision crosses one or more of the boundaries to legislative 
competence). Indeed, it would appear to be the case that – despite the Presiding Officer’s view being 
just that, a view, and not a veto on the introduction of a Bill; despite the possibility that the Scottish 
Government’s Law Officers might pro-actively use the reference procedure to defend contentious 
legislation from post-enactment challenges raised by private parties; and, despite the as yet unmet 
expectation that the UK Law Officers’ reference might become a regularly exercised feature of the 
constitutional settlement – the Scottish Government has adopted a position, barely short of a 
presumption, that its legislation should be introduced with a positive statement by the Presiding 
Officer and, as far as is reasonably practicable, in a way that is unlikely to require or to provoke a 
reference by the Law Officers, even where that means making significant concessions on a Bill prior 
to introduction.   
It is during these iterative processes that the impact of section 101 has been most pronounced. Where 
serious disagreement persists between the Scottish Government and SGLD, the Lord Advocate, OSSP 
and/or OAG about legislative competence, and where Scottish Ministers are not minded to make 
amendments in order to resolve a specific disagreement, section 101 has been deployed by the 
Scottish Government as a reason why its view as to legislative competence should be preferred. This 
is to say that, in the face of concerns about the legislative competence of provisions within a 
legislative scheme (rather than about the legislation as a whole) a typical response by the Scottish 
Government is that any incidental incursion across the boundaries to competence are likely to be read 
down by the UKSC. Thus, during the process of vetting Bills in the Scottish Parliament for legislative 
competence, the question ‘is the legislation as introduced likely to survive judicial scrutiny’ must be 
answered in light of a second set of considerations about whether it is possible to construe the 
legislation narrowly so as to bring it within competence (or to give any possible reading so as to 
render the legislation compatible with Convention rights) and, if so, how the UKSC might conduct 
that exercise (taking account of the proper scope of interpretation of the devolution statutes 
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themselves that as we have seen remains unsettled) - the combination of which might reasonably be 
thought to stretch the benefit of doubt quite considerably. 
A two-fold set of concerns flows from this invocation of section 101 by the executive to leverage the 
benefit of the doubt during the vetting process. First, officials engaged in the vetting process have 
suggested that there is a constitutional problem where the Scottish Government presents to MSPs and 
to the public at large a power to do X in legislation knowing (and possibly conceding to the Presiding 
Officer during the vetting process) that it is likely that the power will be interpreted more narrowly by 
the UKSC in the event of a legal challenge. As David Mead has argued in relation to section 3 HRA: 
Does it not offer an incentive to ministers to agree to term X on the floor of the House or in 
Committee, knowing when it is argued in the courts – at the instigation no doubt of someone who 
stands to lose by term X being applied – they will simply succumb and agree to term Y instead? 
There are grave difficulties with the constitutional suitability and propriety of such a course – and 
who knows in how many…cases it has occurred?113         
Second, and following from this, we have seen that the Scotland Act 1998 envisages a dialogic 
approach between the Scottish Parliament and the courts in the process of judicial constitutional 
review and between the Scottish Government and the legislature in the process of parliamentary 
constitutional review. In this sense recourse to section 101 is doubly problematic. On the one hand, 
the absence of any reporting work done by government or by parliament to map where and why 
primary legislation has been made subject to section 101 (or to section 3 HRA) interpretations by the 
courts hinders the dialogic potential of the exercise. On the other hand, recourse to section 101 by the 
government, in order leverage the benefit of the doubt in undisclosed discussions during the 
parliamentary vetting process, conceals from MSPs the information that they need (for example, the 
true or likely nature of the intended power or its exposure to judicial censure) in the exercise of their 
scrutiny function.114 Meaningful dialogue, in other words, demands from parliamentarians a more 
robust approach to the analysis of legislative competence than the prevailing culture of ignorance of 
and/or deference to the bureaucratic and judicial processes that surround the passage of legislation. 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
The interpretative obligation in section 101 of the Scotland Act has symbolic and practical 
significance. The former is to be found in the signal that it sends – to the UK Parliament as well as to 
the judiciary – about the autonomy and the authority of the Scottish Parliament in the new 
constitutional landscape. Whilst a hard legal boundary has been erected around the legislative 
competence of the devolved legislatures in the shape of strong-form judicial constitutional review, 
section 101 sits alongside the remedial discretion in section 102 in order to preserve, where possible, 
the validity of legislation in a way which presumes that the democratically elected Scottish Parliament 
intends to legislate within the scope of its powers and which encourages judicial restraint in the 
exercise of the strike down power. The latter is to be found in the guidance that it gives to judges as to 
the method by which the interpretative power must be exercised: by reading provisions as narrowly as 
possible so as to bring them within competence. The interpretative obligation therefore highlights in at 
least two ways the tension at the heart of the devolution settlement: its simultaneously enabling and 
constraining force. On the one hand, it enables the Scottish Parliament to legislate close the 
boundaries of legislative competence, comforted by the ‘bias in favour of devolution’ implicit in the 
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provision, whilst at the same time constraining the Scottish Parliament by applying a negatively 
formulated test in order to prevent the expansion of legislative competence by judicial rather than 
legislative means. On the other hand, it enables the judiciary – as in Anderson v HMA - to save 
legislation that it would otherwise (and with some reluctance) be required to strike down, whilst at the 
same time constraining the judiciary by directing them not only to the object of their task (the 
sympathetic interpretation of legislation) but also – and in contrast to the discretion entrusted to the 
judiciary by the analogue provision in section 3 HRA – to the method to be applied in the 
performance of that task. The argument that flows from this has been three-fold. First, that the 
practical significance of section 101 has been diluted by the willingness of the courts to avoid its 
constraining force by preferring in Convention rights cases (those which constitute the bulk of the 
devolution case load) to apply the more liberal test in section 3 HRA. Second, that the symbolic force 
of section 101 during the passage of the Scotland Bill was an effective means by the Labour 
government of straddling two contradictory positions: on the one hand, satisfying devolution sceptics 
with the assurance that unwelcome intrusion into reserved areas (including the Union between 
Scotland and England) would be controlled by a robust judicial power; on the other hand, satisfying 
proponents of devolution that the judicial power would only be exercised in its fullest form as a last 
resort where a sympathetic reading of legislation was not possible. Third, that whereas the symbolic 
face of section 101 was directed to the relationship between the centre and the devolved legislature 
and executive, and whereas its practical face was directed to the relationship between the courts and 
the devolved legislature and executive, arguably the most significant impact of section 101 has been 
on the relationship between the Scottish Government and the various actors with whom they engage 
during the process of parliamentary constitutional review. This has a doubly pernicious effect: on the 
one hand, recourse to section 101 might be said to dilute the standard of parliamentary review by 
lowering the threshold that the Scottish Government is required to cross in order to be afforded the 
benefit of the doubt and with that the relatively safe passage of a Bill into law; on the other hand, 
MSPs themselves might be deprived of the information that they need robustly to scrutinise 
legislation where the true nature of powers taken under the Act are concealed behind a confidential 
concession made during bureaucratic exchanges within the vetting process – and undisclosed to MSPs 
themselves during a Bill’s legislative stages - as to their likely interpretation by the UK Supreme 
Court.                 
